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Abstract 
 
This paper investigates the profitability of the zero-cost strategies (Winner-Loser) on the 
Eurozone market for the time period 1999-2009. We find that the Winner portfolio outperforms 
the Loser portfolio by, on average, 0,8% per month when we combine formation and holding 
periods of 3, 6, 9 and 12 months. As the sum of these two periods gets closer to 24 months, the 
excess returns tend to dissipate. The momentum profits are consistent throughout the different 
sub-periods analyzed. The current financial crisis does not diminish these profits, as it affects the 
Losers more dramatically than the Winners. We observe the return continuation phenomenon 
across most of the countries and industries included in our study. Controlling for these two 
factors leads to a small decrease of our profits in the case of a country-neutral portfolio and to a 
more significant decrease for an industry-neutral portfolio, which indicates towards the industry 
factor as being responsible, to a small extent, for the existence of the momentum profits. 
Adjusting for systematic risk, size and value factors increases the excess returns and suggests that 
these factors cannot explain the abnormal profits. 
 
 
Keywords: Momentum, Winner and Loser portfolios, zero-investment strategy, country, 
industry. 
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1. Introduction 
In this first chapter the reader is introduced to the background of the study and the problem 
discussion. We state the papers purpose, limitations, and target group, together with offering an 
outline of the rest of the paper. 
 
1. Background 
 
The Efficient Market Hypothesis states that today’s price of a security should reflect all publicly 
available information or, at least, the past information (according to the weakest form). As this 
hypothesis constitutes the base point for the most of financial theory, there is a lot of research 
dedicated to checking its validity. A distinct aspect of this research is investor’s reaction to new 
information, given that the most of the asset pricing models are built upon the assumption that 
investors' behaviour is rational and it leads to all the new information being incorporated into a 
security’s price immediately. However, the finance research done in the second half of the 20
th
 
century, and particularly towards its end, is not based on this assumption; on contrary, authors’ 
findings indicate against it. 
 
Developed by Louis Bachelier in 1900 in his thesis Theory of Speculation (Lo and MacKinlay 
1990), the random walk hypothesis implies the unpredictability of the stock prices. Tomorrow’s 
stock price fluctuations will reflect only tomorrow’s news and not today’s price fluctuations, i.e. 
the stock price incorporates the new information immediately. Nowadays the common belief is 
that stock prices do not follow random walks, empirical studies showing that there are 
correlations among the lagged prices. Rejecting the random walk hypothesis leads to price 
changes being forecastable, thus allowing an investor to earn abnormal profits which are profits 
in excess of those earned as a compensation for risk. 
 
2. Problem discussion 
 
Starting with the mid 1980s a lot of research has been done in order to check the Efficient Market 
and the Random Walk hypotheses and thus to determine the possibility of forecasting future 
returns using publicly available information. Summing up, two categories of stock returns’ 
tendencies have been identified. The first one is the short and long term return mean-reversion 
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and the second one is the medium term return continuation. Two groundbreaking papers could be 
thought as representing milestones in documenting these behaviours. The first one belongs to 
DeBondt and Thaler (1985) and demonstrates that a strategy which consists of buying prior loser 
stocks and selling prior winner stocks (which is called a contrarian strategy) earns significant 
abnormal returns on a long run. The second one was written by Jegadeesh and Titman in 1993 
and shows that a momentum strategy that involves buying stocks that performed well in the past 
and selling stocks that performed badly results in abnormal profits on a medium run, particularly 
on a 3 to 12 month horizon. A momentum (contrarian) strategy implies buying (selling) past well 
performing stocks or selling (buying) past badly performing stocks expecting them to continue 
(revert) their past performance. It can also be a self financing strategy which would consist of 
simultaneously buying past well (poor) performing stocks with the proceeds from selling short 
past poor (well) performing stocks expecting a price continuation (reversal). 
 
As the standard asset pricing models encounter problems in explaining these anomalies the 
behavioural theories gained more and more popularity and attention. Behavioural theories relax 
the assumptions of investors’ rationality and computational capacity (Hong and Stein, 1998) and 
focus instead on psychological determinants of their behaviour. Such determinants were 
suggested to be investors’ overconfidence and self-attribution bias (Daniel et al, 1998), 
conservatism (Barberis et al, 1998) or underreaction to the public information (Hong and Stein, 
1999). On a medium term stock prices underreact to news which is then gradually incorporated; 
this leads to the momentum effect. On a long term stock prices overreact to consistent patterns of 
news which then leads to a reversal to the fundamental value (Barberis et al, 1998). 
 
3. Purpose  
 
The main purpose of this paper is determining whether momentum strategies are profitable at the 
individual stocks level, industry level and country level within the perimeter of countries 
members of the Eurozone, together with analyzing the potential momentum sources. Findings 
demonstrating momentum strategies profitability on one or more of these levels would indicate 
towards the inefficiency of this market.  
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4. Limitations 
 
This study includes the countries members of the Eurozone as of 31 December 2008, thus 
resulting 15 countries.
1
 All major listed and liquid companies belonging to national stock 
exchanges of these countries are included in the study.  
 
The time period analyzed extends from 01.01.1999 to 01.04.2009, as older periods have already 
been included in previous studies, though not for the same market. Furthermore, this time period 
allows us to capture both the “internet bubble” phenomenon from 1999-2000 and the world 
financial crisis which became visible in Europe in the fall of 2008.   
 
The novelty brought by our study consists of applying previously used methods in momentum 
effect research to a completely new market – the Eurozone - and for a time period that includes 
the current global financial crisis. According to our knowledge, no such study has been 
previously performed. 
 
Our main source of time series data is Datastream. Monthly data was used as it is recommended 
by most of the previous studies; moreover, it will allow us to compare our results to the previous 
findings. In order to avoid the “survivorship bias” we include the companies which have been 
delisted throughout the time period analyzed.  
 
5. Target group 
 
The target group this paper is aimed at consists in general of people interested in and having 
some general knowledge of finance. These could be students, professors, researchers, as well as 
investors and potential investors interested in the peculiarities of the stock market. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1
  Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, 
Portugal, Slovenia and Spain. 
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6. Outline 
 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: 
 
Chapter 2: Relevant theoretical issues and research that has been done in this area are presented. 
We present the most important articles that have contributed to the understanding of the issue 
treated in this paper. 
 
Chapter 3: We present the data and the methodology that we have used, describing in detail each 
step, thus making replication possible. We describe both the method that was used in the 
momentum effect study and the method used for the analysis of its sources. 
 
Chapter 4: We present the results we have come up to. We analyze our results through diverse 
tests for determining economic and statistical significance and interpret them according to the 
existing theories. We analyze the potential sources of momentum profitability. 
 
Chapter 5: A summary of our findings is presented in this chapter, together with suggestions for 
further research. 
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2. Theoretical framework 
In this chapter the relevant theoretical issues and research that has been done in this area are 
presented. We summarize the most important articles that have contributed to the understanding 
of the issues treated in this paper. 
 
2.1 Efficient Market Hypothesis  
 
According to Fama (1970), an efficient market means a market in which security prices fully 
incorporate all the available information. As new information becomes available, prices fluctuate 
depending only on it. The new information is reflected instantaneously in the security prices and 
this makes them unpredictable. Depending on the degree of novelty of the information the price 
is based upon, Fama distinguishes three possible forms of market efficiency: 
 
• The weak form of market efficiency states that current security prices reflect all the past 
information. Since the prices already reflect all the past information, there should be no 
possibility to predict future performance using the same past returns, as there is no relation 
between these and the future returns. Equilibrium is not required by this hypothesis; required 
is only the impossibility of the market participants to systematically profit from market 
inefficiencies.  As the prices are believed to follow a random walk they are not correlated 
throughout a time period, thus there are no patterns that could be exploited. A pattern 
allowing for abnormal profits would be mitigated away by the fact that all the investors 
would try to earn these profits, in consequence exhausting them.  
 
• The semi-strong form of market efficiency claims that current security prices reflect all the 
historical information and publicly available information. Assuming that investors are 
rational none of them should be able to earn abnormal profits as they identify the same factors 
determining the security prices formation in the public information. As prices incorporate the 
new information very quickly no investor could earn abnormal profits by trading on this 
information. 
 
• The strong form of market efficiency ads to the previous the fact that private information is 
also reflected in the security prices. Given that the insider information is already incorporated 
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in the price an investor should acquire new private information and act rather quickly in order 
to obtain abnormal returns. As this is expected to be very costly and improbable and adding 
the fact that it is also illegal in the most of the markets, the possibility of earning excess 
returns would be reduced to zero. 
 
The strong form of market efficiency is thought to be extreme by most researchers and acts more 
like a benchmark when observing the deviations from market efficiency (Fama, 1970). However, 
the common belief is that the markets exhibit at least the weak form of efficiency. Finding that 
momentum strategies are profitable as a result of our research would come in contradiction with 
this hypothesis. 
 
2.2 Random Walk 
 
According to the random walk hypothesis, security prices do not follow any patterns or trends 
throughout time. Instead, their behaviour can be described as a ‘random walk’, i.e. there are no 
correlations among them. This leads to the fact that it is impossible to predict the future 
performance of a security from its past performance.  
 
The beginnings of the random walk hypothesis can be attributed to Louis Bachelier’s thesis 
written in 1900 Theory of Speculation (Lo and MacKinlay 1990) and since then it constituted an 
important subject of research and debates among financial researchers. Its popularity increased as 
new research confirmed its validity. An especially strong impact had the papers written by 
Kendall (1953), Fama (1965) and Malkiel (1973). However, towards the end of the 20
th
 century 
the confidence in the random walk hypothesis was seriously shaken by a new wave of research. 
Among others, Lo and MacKinlay (1990) mention “it is by now well-known that the 
unforecastability of asset returns is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition of economic 
equilibrium. And, in view of recent empirical evidence, it is also apparent that historical stock 
market prices do not follow random walks”. There are three versions of the random walk 
hypothesis (Asgharian, 2008): 
 
• Random Walk 1 (RW1) is the strongest version and it implies that the price changes are 
independent and identically distributed (IID). 
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• Random Walk 2 (RW2) relaxes the second assumption, stating that price changes are still 
independent, but not identically distributed (INID). 
 
• Random Walk 3 (RW3) is the weakest form of random walk hypothesis and it relaxes both 
assumptions and implies that returns can be dependent, but they have to be uncorrelated and 
they can be not identically distributed (DNID). 
 
2.3 Previous research 
 
2.3.1 Momentum 
 
Momentum strategy meaning to buy stocks that performed well in the past and to sell stocks that 
performed poorly was analyzed by a wide range of researches. Perhaps the most influential work 
in this area belongs to Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) who document that investors that follow the 
momentum strategy can earn significant positive returns over holding periods of 3-12 months. 
They based their research on US data, namely the returns of stocks listed in NYSE and AMEX. 
The sample period was 25 years (1965-1989). The method that Jegadeesh and Titman applied to 
analyze this strategy included creation of winner and loser portfolios. The winner portfolio 
contains the decile which is formed from the best performing stocks for the previous J number of 
months, while the loser portfolio consists of the decile of the worst performing stocks over the 
same period. Momentum strategy implies buying the winner portfolio and/or selling short the 
loser portfolio. The resulting zero-investment portfolio is held for the next K number of months. 
In order to perform the analysis they ranked the stocks based on their returns over the last 3, 6, 9, 
and 12 months and subsequently they were held over the same periods of 3, 6, 9, and 12 months. 
This produced 16 strategies plus an additional 16 where the authors skipped a week between the 
formation period and the holding period. Jegadeesh and Titman concluded that the most 
successful trading strategy is to form portfolios based on their past 12-months performance and to 
hold them for 3 months. A detailed examination of the strategy that uses stocks based on their 6-
month returns with holding period of 6 months shows that abnormal returns cannot be attributed 
to systematic risk; moreover, they conclude that these excess profits are not due to lead-lag 
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effects. Jegadeesh and Titman also find that momentum strategies generate abnormal returns on 
an intermediate investment horizon between 1 and 12 months. However, short-term (less than 1 
month) and long-term performance of the momentum strategies proved to be unprofitable (due to 
return mean-reversals). 
 
Rouwenhorst (1998) documents the presence of medium-term return continuation on 
international equity markets. He analyzes twelve European countries
1
 for the sample period 
between 1980 and 1995. The method that is used in the research is similar to the one applied by 
Jegadeesh and Titman (1993). Rouwenhorst constructs internationally diversified relative 
strength portfolios investing in medium-term winners and selling past medium-term losers. 
Following Jegadeesh and Titman, Rouwenhorst examined 32 trading strategies and found that the 
most successful strategy is the one based on 12 month evaluation period and 3 month holding 
period. The main finding is that this portfolio earns approximately 1% per month. Such a return 
continuation takes place in all twelve sample countries, and it is negatively related to firm size, 
i.e. return continuation is stronger for small than for large firms. Momentum effect does not last 
longer than 1 year and can not be explained by conventional measures of risk. Rouwenhorst’s 
results for European countries are similar to findings for US market by Jegadeesh and Titman. 
 
Moskowitz and Grinblatt (1999) analyze the momentum effect on the industry level of stock 
returns. They use data for twenty value-weighted industries portfolios for the period from July 
1963 till July 1995. Their paper documents the evidence that the individual momentum effect is 
subsumed by the industry momentum. The industry momentum appears to be highly profitable 
even if the portfolios are neutral regarding size, book-to-market equity, individual stock 
momentum, cross-sectional dispersion in mean returns, and potential microstructure influences. 
Momentum strategy is highly profitable at intermediate investment horizon (up to 24 months), 
with the paper mostly focusing on abnormal returns over 6 to 12 months. 
 
Nijman, Swinkels, and Verbeek (2002) analyze the medium-term return continuation in Europe, 
the main goal of their study being to identify the sources of the momentum effect. As potential 
                                                 
1
 Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and 
the United Kingdom 
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determinants of the momentum effect they consider the country, industry, size, and value factors. 
Moreover, they examine in detail the presence of country and industry momentum effects. The 
methodology applied in their study is a portfolio-based regression approach that allows 
decomposing overall momentum effect on individual, country and industry elements. Nijman et 
al use the data for 15 European countries and 23 industries for the sample period 1990-2000. The 
main finding is that excess returns of momentum strategies are driven by individual stock effects 
rather than industry or country factors. These conclusions are in contradiction with Moskowitz 
and Grinblatt (1999) who claim that industry momentum drives the whole momentum effect in 
US. The inclusion of the size and value effects into the Nijman et al model shows that momentum 
strategy is more profitable for small, growth stocks than for large value stocks. These results are 
consistent with behavioural finance theories presented by Hong and Stein (1998) and Daniel et al 
(1998). 
 
The study performed by Cooper, Gutierrez, and Hameed (2004) examines overreaction theories 
of short-term momentum and long-term reversals in the stock returns. They analyse monthly 
returns from 1929 till 1995. Following previous models developed by Jegadeesh and Titman 
(1993) and DeBondt and Thaler (1985) they test whether market overreactions are the sources of 
these effects. Cooper et al examine two states: “up” when the lagged market return is non-
negative and “down” when lagged three-year market return is negative. They found that short-
term momentum profits follow the up state, while long-run reversals follow down state. 
 
The summarized results of previous research on momentum are presented in Table 2. 
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Authors Year Method Data Results
Creation of winner and loser 
portfolios
US market The most successful trading strategy is12-3 
Analysis of zero-investment 
portfolio (winner-loser)
NYSE and 
AMEX stock 
returns
Examination of 16 trading 
strategies
1965-1989 
monthly
Creation of winner and loser 
portfolios
European 
market
The most successful trading strategy is12-3 
Analysis of zero-investment 
portfolio (winner-loser)
12 European 
countries
Momentum portfolio portfolio earns 
approximately 1% per month
Examination of 16 trading 
strategies
1980-1995 
monthly
Return continuation is stronger for small than 
for large firms
Momentum effect lasts not more than 1 year 
Creation of winner and loser 
portfolios
US market
Momentum profits are driven by the industry 
effect
Simple returns model that allows 
to illustrate momentum sources
NYSE, AMEX 
and Nasdaq 
stock returns
Momentum strategies are highly profitable even 
after controlling for size, book-to-market equity, 
and individual stock momentum
1963-1995 
monthly
Momentum strategy is profitable at 
intermediate investment horizon 
Portfolio-based regression 
approach
European 
market
Excess returns of momentum strategies are 
driven by individual stock effects 
Decomposition of overall 
momentum effect on individual, 
country, and industry elements
15 European 
countries, 23 
industries
Momentum strategy is more profitable for small 
growth stocks 
1990-2000 
monthly
Creation of winner and loser 
portfolios
US market Short-term momentum profits follow up state
Analysis of momentum and 
contrarian strategies
NYSE and 
AMEX stock 
Long-run reversals follow down state
Examination of two states "up" 
and "down"
1929-1995 
monthly
Creation of winner and loser 
portfolios
Momentum strategy is efficient at the medium 
investment horizon 
Empirical decomposition of 
profits, bootstrap and Monte 
Carlo simulations
Contrarian strategy gives abnormal returns at 
long-term horizon
Cross-sectional variation in expected returns of 
individual securities is source of the profitability 
of trading strategy.
J.Conrad     
G.Kaul
1998
T.Nijman 
L.Swinkels 
M.Verbeek
2002
M.Cooper 
R.Gutierrez 
A.Hameed
2004
K. Rouwenhorst 1998
T. Moskowitz 
M.Grinblatt
1999
Table 2.1. Previous studies of momentum strategies
N. Jegadeesh 
Sh. Titman
1993
Momentum strategy generates abnormal 
returns at intermediate investment horizon
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2.3.2. Contrarian 
 
For the first time the profitability of contrarian strategies was documented by DeBondt and 
Thaler (1985) who studied psychological aspects of individual decision making and how this 
behaviour affects stock prices. Up until now it is still considered the most important study 
documenting and explaining contrarian strategies. Promoters of behavioural finance, the authors 
suggest that the majority of people tend to overreact to unexpected events. Their analysis is based 
on CRCP monthly return data. In their research DeBondt and Thaler present evidence which 
states that portfolios of previous losers outperform portfolios of prior winners in long investment 
horizon (thirty-six months after the portfolio formation). Contrarian strategy of buying past 
losing stocks and to sell past winning stocks is profitable on long-term horizon (3 to 5 years). 
These returns of a contrarian portfolio are negatively autocorrelated. Moreover they detect the 
presence of the calendar effect as large positive excess returns of losers portfolios were earned 
every January. This effect is observed five years after portfolio formation. 
 
Lo and MacKinlay (1990) investigate contrarian investment strategies and their probability to be 
due to market overreactions. They conclude that portfolios based on return reversals earn excess 
profits that could be explained by cross-autocorrelation effects (lead-lag relations). However 
Jegadeesh and Titman (1992) present another decomposition of short-term contrarian profits. The 
decomposition is based on single factor model. In contrast with Lo and MacKinlay they find out 
that lead-lag effect explains only 5% of contrarian profits while the major source of abnormal 
profits are market overreactions. 
 
Conrad and Kaul (1998) in their paper examined two investment strategies - momentum and 
contrarian – at eight different horizons and different time periods. For this kind of analysis they 
applied empirical decomposition of profits, bootstrapping and Monte Carlo simulations. They 
document that momentum strategy is profitable on a medium investment horizon (3 to 12 
months) except during the 1926-1947 sub-period, while contrarian strategy yields abnormal 
returns on a long-term horizon. Another important finding is that cross-sectional variation in 
expected returns of individual securities plays a major role in determining the profitability of 
trading strategy. 
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The summarized results of previous research on contrarian are presented in Table 3. 
 
Authors Year Method Data Results
Creation of winner and loser 
portfolios
Portfolios based on return reversals earn 
excess profits
Examination of expected profits 
of contrarian strategies under 
various assumptions on the 
return generation process
Excess returns are explained by cross-
autocorrelation effects (lead-lag relations)
Creation of winner and loser 
portfolios
US market
Contrarian strategyis efficient on long-term 
horizon (3 to 5 years)
Analysis of contrarian strategy 
(losers-winners)
CRCP 
monthly return 
data
Contrarian portfolio is negatively autocorrelated
Presence of calendar effect 
Creation of winner and loser 
portfolios
lead-lag effect explains only 5% of contrarian 
profits
Decomposition of short-term 
contrarian profits
the major source of abnormal profits are 
market overreactions
Table 2.2. Previous studies of contrarium strategies
W.Lo 
A.MacKinlay
1989
F.De Bondt 
R.Thaler
1985
N. Jegadeesh 
Sh. Titman
1992
 
 
2.3.3 Behavioural finance  
 
Behavioural finance is a research field that applies scientific research in human psychology in 
order to determine how economic decisions made by individuals are reflected in the allocation of 
resources, formation of market prices etc. In this section we present the most important research 
that has been done in this area and the relevant findings it has produced.  
 
Kahneman and Tversky develop in 1979 the Prospect theory which can be seen as an alternative 
to the expected utility theory. It explains the way individuals make their choices under conditions 
of risk, how they evaluate risky alternatives by weighting potential gains and losses. The decision 
taking process is organized in two steps. In the first step, a benchmark is established and 
outcomes below it are viewed as losses whilst the ones above are viewed as gains. In the second 
step values of the possible outcomes are calculated and the outcome yielding the highest value is 
chosen. An important phenomenon documented by this paper is the representativeness heuristic 
which means that when evaluating the probability of an uncertain event a person takes into 
consideration “the degree to which it is (i) similar in its essential properties to the parent 
population, (ii) reflects the salient features of the process by which it is generated”. A 
consequence of this fact is that even when people are confronted with a sample of random 
information they believe they can see patterns. This leads to an overvaluation of a company and 
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then to a price reversal. An interesting finding of this paper is the so-called four-fold pattern of 
risk attitudes, which answers the question: why do people buy both lottery tickets and insurance? 
It seems that individuals exhibit risk-averse attitude in case of moderate gains probabilities and 
small losses probability and, at the same time, risk-accepting attitude in case of moderate losses 
probability and small gains probability. This effect has come to be known as the pseudocertainty 
effect. Furthermore, the paper documents the fact that people tend to use any available 
information when making a decision. This can even be irrelevant information if no other is 
available. 
 
Barberis, Shleifer and Vishny (1998) treat in detail the over- and underreaction phenomena. 
Underreaction is observed on time horizons between 1 month and 1 year, when information is 
gradually incorporated into the prices and the prices are positively autocorrelated. Due to this fact 
positive future performance can be forecasted from the past positive performance. Over longer 
periods of time, usually 3 to 5 years, overreaction phenomenon manifests itself as a result of 
positive news patterns, that is a stock with a long history of past positive returns will be highly 
overvalued and when future expected performance does not materialize prices tend to revert to 
the mean. As causes for over- and underreaction Barberis et al mention the findings of Tversky 
and Kahneman (1974) and Edwards (1968), namely representativeness heuristic, explained 
above, and conservatism, which means a slow reaction when confronted with new information. 
The model employed by the authors assumes earnings that follow a random walk. The investor is 
not aware of that and instead he thinks the earnings are moving between a mean-reverting state 
and a trendy state. As the transition probabilities and earning’s statistical properties are rigid there 
is a higher probability of remaining in the same state than of switching. The investor updates his 
beliefs of which state he is in each period by observing the earnings. Thus repetitive positive 
earnings surprises increase the probability of him perceiving himself as being in the price 
continuation state, while a negative surprise following a positive one does the same for the mean-
reverting state. Solving this model yields a confirmation of the conservatism and 
representativeness.  
 
Daniel, Hirshleifer and Subrahmanyam (1997) explain security prices anomalies based on the 
phenomena of investor overconfidence and self-attribution bias. Overconfidence is not typical 
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only in the financial context but it was also documented by psychologists, engineers, attorneys, 
physicians etc. In the financial context particularly important are the contributions of Ahlers and 
Lakonishok (1983), Elton, Gruber and Gulteking (1984), Froot and Frankel (1989), DeBondt and 
Thaler (1990) and DeBondt (1991). The overconfidence theory says that “individuals 
overestimate their own abilities in various contexts” (Daniel et al 1997). In the authors’ model, an 
overconfident individual is one who overestimates the accuracy of the private information he 
obtains regarding the value of a security. As investors have more confidence in information they 
are more involved with, they will be more overconfident in the private information they receive 
before others than in the public information everybody receives at the same time. This leads to an 
overreaction to private signal and to an underreaction to public signals. As time passes, 
overreaction effect dissipates and more public information becomes available and gets 
incorporated into the price, thus correcting it towards its fundamental value. The self-attribution 
bias means that investor’s confidence grows when public information confirms his private 
information; however, when his information is infirmed, his confidence does not decrease 
proportionally. Broad psychological research documents the fact that individuals tend to give 
themselves credit for past successes whilst blaming external factors for past failures (Fischoff 
1982, Langer and Roth 1975, Miller and Ross 1975, Taylor and Brown 1988). 
  
Hong and Stein (1998) introduce a model consisting of newswatchers and momentum chasers, 
none of them being fully rational, both only being able to process only some subset of publicly 
available information. This contradicts the assumption of homogeneity, as now we are dealing 
with heterogeneity. The two types of traders use different information when valuing a security. 
Newswatchers use only private information about a company’s future prospects while 
momentum traders rely on the past performance of a company when valuing it. Resulting from 
this, underreaction is exhibited when only the newswatchers are active, as the new information 
releases diffuse slowly within the newswatchers being thus gradually incorporated into the prices. 
When momentum traders come also into play, they accelerate this diffusion as they notice the 
above mentioned underreaction and the resulting positive autocorrelation meaning profit 
opportunities and they exploit them. However this mitigation of the underreaction leads to a 
higher sensibility to the news releases which causes in consequence overreaction. If assuming 
that the momentum traders use only simple strategies, i.e. not conditioned on all available 
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information, their intervention does not fully mitigate the underreaction and does not lead to the 
markets becoming efficient (or approximately efficient). 
 
A summary of the previous research we consider most relevant for our study is provided in Table 
2.3. 
 
Authors Year Main focus
Table 2.3. Previous studies of behavioural finance
Results
Kahneman 
Tversky
1979
The way individuals make 
decisions under conditions of 
risk and the way they evaluate 
risky alternatives
Phenomenon of the representativeness heuristic 
Four-fold pattern of risk attitudes
Individuals tend to use any available even irrelevant 
information when making a decision
Pseudocertainty effect
Overevaluation of the company by individuals that leads to 
price reversals
Barberis 
Shleifer    
Vishny
1998
Underreaction and overreaction 
phenomena using model which 
assumes earnings that follow a 
random walk
Underreaction is observed on time horizons between 1 month 
and 1 year
Over 3 to 5 years periods overreaction phenomenon is a result 
of positive news patterns
Confirmation of the conservatism and representativeness 
phenomena
Daniel 
Hirshleifer 
Subrahmanyan
1997 Security price anomalies 
Investors' overreaction to private signal and an underreaction 
to public signals
Self-attribution bias which means that investor confidence 
grows when public information confirms his private information
Individuals overestimate their own abilities in various contexts
Hong          
Stein
1998
Two type of traders - 
newswatchers and momentum 
chasers
Newswatchers use only private information about company’s 
future prospects
Momentum traders rely on the past performance of a company 
when valuing it
Underreaction is exhibited when the newswatchers are active
Presence of momentum traders does not mitigate the 
underreaction and does not lead to the efficiency in the market
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3. Methodology 
In this chapter we present the data and the methodology that we have used, describing in detail 
both the method that was used in the momentum effect study and the method used for the analysis 
of its sources. 
 
 
3.1 Data 
 
For the empirical analysis of the different momentum strategies we use the monthly stock returns 
of individual companies from various industries. As the source of collecting the data we chose 
Thomson Datastream (Datastream), assuming the reliability of the information offered. We split 
the companies from our sample in 25 industries
1
. As the primary industry differentiation we used 
the classification presented in Datastream. However, we afterwards merged some of the related 
industries in order to obtain the industry classification used by the Morgan Stanley Capital 
International (MSCI). In consequence, Electricity and Gas and Water became Utilities, Fixed 
Line Telecommunications and Mobile Telecommunications were grouped in Telecommunications 
Services. This classification has a more widespread use and at the same time yields fewer 
industries than the ones found on Datastream, which makes the analysis more parsimonious and 
comprehensible.  
 
The data is collected for an approximately 10-year period from January 1999 until April 2009. 
The main reason for choosing this period was the fact that no other momentum study is recent 
enough to include the current global financial crisis. As the starting point of the period we chose 
1999, thus obtaining a time period bordered by to crises – the ’99-00’ “internet bubble” 
phenomenon and the current financial crisis.  
 
                                                 
1
 Energy, Automobiles, Banks, Beverages, Chemicals, Constructions and Materials, Utilities, Electronical and 
Electrical Equipment, Financial Services, Telecommunication Services, Food Producers, Food and Drug Retailers, 
Forestry and Paper, General Industrials, Household Goods, Leisure Goods, Media, Insurance, Oil and Gas, 
Personal Goods, Pharmaceuticals, Biotechnology and Life Sciences, Real Estate, Software and Services, Technology 
Hardware and Equipment, Travel and Leisure. 
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The data is collected for 15 countries that joined the Eurozone before January 1, 2009: Austria, 
Belgium, Cyprus, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Malta, the 
Netherlands, Portugal, Slovenia and Spain. Our final data sample includes 5391 companies 
grouped by country and industry characteristics. From the Appendix A.1 it can be seen that the 
distribution of companies between different countries in our data sample is not balanced. More 
than half (3001) of all EMU companies operate in Germany and France. Other almost 20% of 
firms are concentrated in Belgium, Greece and Italy. Thus 5 of the 15 Eurozone countries contain 
more than three quarters of the companies from our data sample. 
 
The distribution of firms among various industries is presented in Appendix A.2. The largest 
amount of firms (around 12%) operates in the General Industrials industry. Financial Services 
and Software contain around 10% of companies each. So, more than 30% of all companies are 
concentrated in three industries, the rest 70% of the firms are distributed among other 22 
industries. In order to calculate the monthly returns for each company we apply the dividend 
adjusted formula: 
1
1
−
+
=
−t
tt
ti
P
DP
R  
 
Where Rit – stock return in month t; Pt and Pt-1 – stock prices in month t and t-1; Dt – dividends 
paid in month t. For stock prices we take monthly closing prices. 
 
We collect stock closing prices for all companies that activated in various industries in the 
Eurozone during the time period analyzed (January 1999 until April 2009). We include the newly 
established firms and the delisted companies throughout this period. The inclusion of delisted 
companies is particularly important in order to avoid the “survivorship bias”. Omitting this aspect 
will lead to excessively positive results.  
 
We also collected some additional data in order to perform our regressions. We chose the 
Datastream estimated EMU-DS as the market index, considering it the most relevant index, as it 
contains the countries and industries we included in our study. However, it is worth to be 
mentioned that it does not include all the companies in our sample. Other indexes as MSCI EMU 
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or FTSE EMU show very similar to EMU-DS performances.  Based on this index we calculated 
the monthly market returns. We use these returns as a reflection of the Eurozone market 
performance. For the risk-free interest rate we took the monthly yield of 3-months bonds issued 
by European Central Bank (Euribor 3-months).  
 
3.2 Method 
 
3.2.1 Theoretical specifications 
 
The method we use in our research resembles partly that applied by Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) 
and Rouwenhorst (1998). Based on the previously calculated returns we construct winner and 
loser portfolios in the same way the mentioned authors did. The main difference results from 
introducing the industry as a possible determinant of the momentum strategies profitability. We 
form loser and winner portfolios for the whole number of stocks from the Eurozone, as well as 
within each of the industries and countries. Besides analyzing the profitability of momentum 
strategies for the whole market, we investigate this type of strategies for each country and 
industry in order to determine where the profitability is more pronounced. In case of finding the 
momentum strategies being profitable for the Eurozone market, the country and industry factors 
will be used in constructing country- and industry-neutral portfolios. This will allow us to 
determine the degree to which these factors contribute to the total profitability, as there is some 
controversy among researchers related to this subject. Moskowitz and Grinblatt (1999) find that 
the momentum effect for US is subsumed by the industry momentum while Grundy and Martin 
(2001) suggest that industry and individual stock momentum are distinct. Nijman et al (2002) 
suggest that the momentum effect for the European market is mainly driven by the individual 
momentum and it is not subsumed by the industry and country momentum. Moreover, Chan et al 
(2000) document a six-month momentum effect on a country level while Richards (1997) finds 
there is no country momentum effect. We hope our findings will contribute to shedding some 
further light on this issue. 
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3.2.2 Portfolio construction 
 
In line with Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) we construct winner and loser portfolios. At the 
beginning of each month t the stocks are ranked according to their performance in the previous J 
months, where J can be 1, 2, 3 or 4 quarters. The resulting ascending list is split in 10 equally-
weighted deciles, where the first decile consists of the most poorly performing stocks and 
represents the Loser portfolio, while the last decile consists of the best performing stocks and 
forms the Winner portfolio. The resulting Winner and Loser portfolios are subsequently held for 
K months, where K can be 1, 2, 3 or 4 quarters. In each month of the holding period the zero-cost 
strategy we analyze sells short the Loser portfolio and buys the Winner portfolio, thus the 
strategy’s profit is yielded by the difference between Winner portfolio’s returns and Loser 
portfolio’s returns. As the holding period is longer than the time interval over which information 
is available, we obtain portfolios with overlapping holding periods. This means that in each 
month t the strategies are composed of portfolios that are formed in the current month, as well as 
in the previous K-1 months. Thus for K = 3, the strategy will contain winner and loser portfolios 
formed in the current month and the previous two months. The weights of 1/K stocks are 
rebalanced each month, while the rest are carried over until the end of their respective holding 
period. Using overlapping holding periods increases the power of our tests (Jegadeesh and 
Titman, 1993). 
 
The above mentioned procedure of forming portfolios is performed for the whole Eurozone 
market, as well as within each industry and within each country member of the Eurozone. 
Besides investigating the momentum effect for Eurozone, it will allow us to identify the potential 
countries or industries within which the momentum effect has the most persistent presence and 
thus is the most profitable. This would be of interest for investors who intend to exploit the profit 
possibilities resulting from the price continuation. 
 
3.2.3 Testing for statistical significance  
 
After calculating the momentum strategies profitability, we test these results in order to 
determine whether they are significant performing a t-test. As we analyze a zero-cost strategy, we 
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test our results against the null hypothesis stating that the returns are not significantly different 
from zero (µ). The following formula is used: 
N
R
t
KJ
obs
/
/
σ
µ−
=  ~ α,1−nt  
 
Where: tobs is the t-value; RJ/K is the mean return of the zero-cost portfolio; µ is set to zero; σ is the 
standard deviation of the sample; N is the number of observations; α is the confidence level; n-1 
is the number of degrees of freedom. For the results to significant we need that t0 > tn-1,α. 
 
3.2.4 Robustness test 
 
A robustness test is performed for analyzing the consistency of the momentum strategies 
throughout different periods of time. Thus we split our time period in two subperiods, 1999-2003 
and 2004-2009 and analyze the momentum strategies for each of them. Moreover, we analyze 
one more time sub-interval which we obtain by excluding the time period starting with 
September 2008 onwards, as this is considered to be the moment when the global financial crisis 
started to be visible in Europe. This will allow us to analyze the momentum profitability both 
with and without the financial crisis’ influence and to draw conclusions on whether there is still 
observed a return continuation during the crisis or not. Performing a test of robustness makes it 
possible to identify any potential differences in the profitability of the momentum strategies in 
these sub-periods or a tilting towards one of them.  
  
3.3 Determinants of momentum profitability 
 
3.3.1 Relative strength portfolios by country 
 
Following Rouwenhorst (1998) we construct country-neutral portfolios. The momentum 
profitability could be driven by the country, so that stocks in the Winner (Loser) portfolios can be 
tilted towards a better (worse) performing country. We rank the stocks in deciles based on their 
past performance within a certain country and we assign the top performing decile to the Winner 
portfolio and the bottom performing decile to the Loser portfolio, thus forming equally-weighted 
country-neutral portfolios. The results are analyzed for significance. Obtaining significant 
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momentum profits will indicate towards the fact that they are not driven by the country factor, but 
rather by the individual factor.  
 
 
3.3.2 Relative strength portfolios by industry 
 
As stocks belonging to some industries may be better performers than stocks belonging to others, 
the Winner portfolio on the Eurozone level might consist mainly of stocks of such well 
performing industries while the Loser portfolio might include mainly stocks from poor 
performing ones. If this is the case, the momentum effect can be thought as being driven by 
industries and not by the individual factors. To isolate the industry effect from the individual 
effect we construct industry-neutral portfolios. If after this procedure our momentum strategy is 
still profitable, we can conclude this can be attributed to the idiosyncratic firm performance rather 
than to the industry performance.  
 
Industry-neutral portfolios are constructed in the following manner. Stocks are ranked into 
deciles according to their performance only within a particular industry. The top 10 percent 
stocks of each industry will be included in the winner portfolio and the bottom 10 percent in the 
loser portfolio. Thus our Winner and Loser portfolio will include the same percentage of stocks 
from each of the industries analyzed, resulting well-diversified, country-neutral portfolios. A 
significance test will be run for the obtained results. 
 
3.3.3 Adjustment for Market Factor 
 
The abnormal profits yielded by a momentum strategy could be a compensation for the extra-
riskiness of the stocks included in the Winners and Losers portfolios. In order to analyze this 
potential momentum explanation we run the following regression: 
 
Ri,t – rf,t = α + β [Rm,t – rf,t] + εi,t 
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Where Ri,t is the monthly return of Loser or the Winner in the month t, rf,t  is the risk-free rate and 
Rm,t is the market return. We regress the monthly Winner and Loser portfolio returns in excess of 
the monthly risk-free rate of the 3-month Euribor bonds (Ri,t – rf,t) on the monthly returns of the 
EMU market index in excess of the risk-free rate (Rm,t – rf,t). If the momentum profits are due to 
an increased riskiness of the stocks in our portfolios, we should obtain a beta of the Winner-Loser 
portfolio larger than one. Otherwise, it can be concluded that the momentum excess returns are 
not a compensation for risk. We run this regression for Winners and Losers of the three distinct 
portfolios: the unrestricted portfolio, the country-neutral portfolio and the industry-neutral 
portfolio. 
 
3.3.4 Adjustment for Market, Size and Value Factors 
 
As documented by Fama and French (1993), smaller capitalization stocks and stocks with a 
higher book-to-market value tend to have a better performance. In order to analyze whether 
Winner and Loser stocks load heavier on the smaller capitalization stocks or higher value stocks, 
we include these two additional factors and perform the following regression: 
 
Ri,t – rf,t = α + β [Rm,t – rf,t] + γSMB + δHML +  εi,t  
 
SMB stands for “Small Minus Big” capitalization stocks and HML means “High Minus Low” 
value stocks. Obtaining a positive and significant γ would indicate that our portfolios load heavier 
on small stocks and thus the momentum profits are influenced by the size of the stocks in the 
portfolio. Likewise, a positive and significant δ would mean that our portfolios consist of mainly 
high-value stocks, with the negative value meaning a tilting towards growth stocks which are 
more volatile. Significant coefficients for the HML factor would mean that value influences the 
return continuation effect. 
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4. Results and analysis of momentum sources 
In this chapter we present our results concerning the profitability of the momentum strategies, 
together with testing their potential sources. 
 
 
4.1 Profitability of relative strength portfolios 
 
A. Momentum profitability on the Eurozone market 
 
Constructing Winner and Loser portfolios for the Eurozone market resulted in a solid proof of the 
momentum profitability existence. For all the 16 strategies analyzed Winners outperformed the 
Losers by at least 0,1%; 13 out of 16 strategies yielded significant profits at the 5% level (See 
table 4.1). 
 
Ranking period
(J) 3 6 9 12
Loser 0,49% 0,14% 0,20% 0,26%
Winner 1,24% 1,10% 0,97% 0,85%
3 Winner - Loser 0,75% 0,96% 0,77% 0,60%
(t-stat) 2,05 4,20 4,46 3,94
Loser 0,07% -0,10% -0,01% 0,15%
6 Winner 1,28% 1,04% 0,86% 0,70%
Winner - Loser 1,21% 1,14% 0,87% 0,56%
(t-stat) 3,32 5,09 4,93 3,11
Loser 0,04% -0,15% 0,01% 0,16%
9 Winner 0,93% 0,74% 0,59% 0,47%
Winner - Loser 0,89% 0,89% 0,58% 0,30%
(t-stat) 2,59 3,87 2,82 1,53
Loser -0,08% -0,13% 0,06% 0,24%
12 Winner 0,62% 0,48% 0,38% 0,34%
Winner - Loser 0,70% 0,61% 0,32% 0,10%
(t-stat) 1,97 2,34 1,45 0,51
Holding period (K)
Insignificant profits
Table 4.1 Returns of Relative Strength Portfolios
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The average monthly return of the momentum strategies is about 0,8%, which is close to the 1% 
average monthly return documented by other previous studies (Jegadeesh and Titman 1993, 
Rouwenhorst 1998). The lowest monthly return was produced by the J12K12 strategy (0,1%), 
while the highest was earned by the J6K3 strategy (1,21%). This is somewhat different from the 
two above mentioned studies, which document the J12K3 strategy as being the most profitable. 
In our case this strategy yields a slightly lower than the average profit, 0,70% per month. In 
general, our study documents that for longer formation periods combined with longer holding 
periods the momentum profitability and its significance decrease. Thus, the least profitable and 
significant strategies and are J9K12, J12K9 and J12K12. This could indicate that for our data and 
market momentum strategies have a shorter horizon of profitability than it has been previously 
documented. As the time period (J+K) gets closer to 24 months, we observe a strong decrease in 
the Winner portfolio’s returns together with a strong increase in the Loser portfolio’s returns. 
This indicates towards return mean reversion on a medium-to-long term which causes the 
momentum profits to vanish. 
 
In order to make comparisons with previous studies possible, we further focus on the strategy that 
ranks stocks according to their past six month performance and holds them for six month 
subsequently (J6K6). The same strategy is used when analyzing the determinants of the 
momentum profitability. From the Graph 4.1 one can see that this zero-cost strategy clearly 
outperforms the market, earning 1,08% monthly in excess of an index formed by all the stocks 
contained in our sample. The Winner portfolio outperforms the market, having an excess return 
of 0,98%. Furthermore, it can be observed that both Winner’s and Loser’s standard deviations are 
higher than the market’s. Loser’s standard deviation is 38% higher than market’s, while Winner’s 
standard deviation is 7% in excess. As these two portfolios have a higher volatility than the 
market, they are more likely predisposed to a peculiar behavior. 
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Graph 4.1 – The J6K6 Strategy 
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B. Robustness test 
 
In order to check the consistency of the momentum strategies and the eventual differences 
throughout the time horizon analyzed, we analyze the J6K6 strategy for 3 sub-periods: 
1999.01.01-2003.12.31, 2004.01.01-2009.04.01 and 1999.01.01-2008.08.31. The first two sub-
periods represent two approximately equal sub-intervals. For the third sub-period we exclude the 
financial crisis, so that we can investigate whether it affects or not the momentum profitability. 
The start of the financial crisis in Europe we consider to be the 1
st
 of September 2008. Our 
findings are presented in the Table 4.2: 
 
Table 4.2 – Robustness test 
Mean St. Dev. Mean St. Dev. Mean St. Dev. Mean St. Dev.
Winner 1,04% 3,20% 0,75% 3,34% 1,37% 3,02% 1,37% 3,04%
Loser -0,10% 4,14% -0,30% 4,61% 0,13% 3,56% 0,30% 3,98%
Winner-Loser 1,14% 2,37% 1,05% 3,13% 1,24% 0,95% 1,07% 2,43%
t-stat 5,09 2,60 9,44 4,50
Robustness test
1999-2009 1999-2003 2004-2009 1999-2008 (no crisis)
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One can see that the differences among the returns earned by the momentum strategies in each of 
these sub-periods are minor. In each sub-period the profits are above 1%, with the 2004-2009 
being the most profitable sub-period; furthermore, all profits are highly significant at 5% percent 
level. As it was the case for the entire period, the standard deviations of the Loser portfolios are 
higher than the Winner’s for all sub-periods. Excluding the financial crisis period causes the 
standard deviations of the Loser and Winner to slightly decrease, together with a decrease in the 
profitability of the momentum strategy. Higher differences can be observed between the 1999-
2003 and 2004-2009 sub-periods, with the latter being more profitable. One possible explanation 
could be that the ’99-00’ “internet-bubble” period decreased momentum profitability for this sub-
period. An interesting finding is that the current financial crisis did not affect negatively the 
momentum profitability; on contrary, it slightly increased it. It did however affect negatively the 
returns of the Winner and Loser, but it affected the returns of the Loser more drastically than the 
returns of the Winner (-133% compared to -24%). Due to this fact the excess returns of the 
Winner over the Loser in fact increased.  
 
We can conclude that the momentum strategies are consistent throughout the time horizon 
analyzed, yielding returns over 1% in each sub-period. 
 
 
4.2 Sources of the relative strength portfolios profits 
 
In this subsection we try to identify the sources of the momentum profits, analyzing the country 
and industry factors, as well market risk and firms’ size and value as potential explanations of the 
momentum excess returns. 
 
4.2.1 Relative strength portfolios by country 
 
We focus on the relative strength portfolios formed on a country basis. As it was mentioned 
earlier more than a half of the 5391 companies from our sample operate in Germany (1601) and 
France (1400) and more then 75% of all the firms are concentrated in five countries: Belgium 
(278), France (1400), Germany (1601), Greece (374), and Italy (414). A strong momentum effect 
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which is present (only) in these countries could drive the overall effect for the whole Eurozone 
area. Due to this fact we analyse this potential source of the return continuation phenomenon in 
order to determine whether the overall effect is driven by the country factor. 
 
For each of the 15 countries we form relative strength portfolios with the evaluation and holding 
periods being equal to 6 months. This means that at the end of each month stocks from every 
local market are ranked based on their previous six months performance within that market and 
divided into deciles. The top decile companies are considered to be a part of the Winner portfolio 
while the bottom decile companies are grouped in the Loser portfolio. This zero-investment 
strategy of buying the Winner portfolio and selling the Loser portfolio holds these portfolios for 
six months. The resulting country-neutral and equally-weighted portfolio yields an average 
excess return of 1,01% per month. This suggests that overall the momentum profitability is not 
country-driven. However, a very high profitability of some countries could lead to the 
momentum strategy being profitable even if in the absence of such type of profitability in the 
other countries. From table 4.3 we can see that this is not the case, though. 
 
Portfolio Mean St.dev. t  (mean)
1 Austria 0,77% 3,26% 2,48
2 Belgium 1,37% 2,29% 6,34
3 Cyprus -0,02% 6,18% -0,04
4 Finland 1,89% 3,59% 5,57
5 France 0,63% 2,85% 2,35
6 Germany 1,10% 2,76% 4,23
7 Greece 0,77% 4,37% 1,87
8 Ireland 1,67% 3,45% 5,11
9 Italy 1,68% 2,51% 7,10
10 Luxembourg 0,99% 2,60% 4,02
11 Malta 1,03% 1,68% 6,49
12 Netherlands 0,77% 4,01% 2,04
13 Portugal -0,01% 5,08% -0,02
14 Slovenia 1,36% 4,25% 3,38
15 Spain 1,15% 2,13% 5,70
All stocks (Country-neutral) 1,01% 1,61% 2,43
Insignificant at 5% level
Table 4.3 Returns of Relative Strength Portfolios by Country
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In 13 out of 15 countries included in the sample momentum profits are present. Only two 
countries exhibit slightly negative monthly returns, Cyprus and Portugal. However, as it can be 
seen in the Appendix A.1, these two countries account for just 5% of all firms in the data sample. 
Moreover, as these returns are insignificant, no strong inferences regarding momentum 
unprofitability within these two markets can be drawn. All the other countries demonstrate 
positive monthly returns that vary in average from 0,63% for France to 1,68% for Italy. In terms 
of significance, Greece is the only country with positive, but insignificant excess returns at 5% 
level; at 10% level they are significant, however.  
 
Controlling for country composition lowers the returns of the J6K6 strategy very slightly, from 
1,14% to 1,01%. The average standard deviation of each country’s excess returns is 1,61%  
compared to 2,37%, which is the standard deviation of our reference portfolio. This suggests that 
a country-neutral portfolio is better diversified. At the same time, the average individual country 
standard deviation (3,40%) is more than two times higher than that of the resulting internationally 
diversified portfolio (1,61%), meaning that a great amount of momentum profits volatility is 
specific to a particular country and can be diversified internationally.  
 
Our findings show that evidence of return continuation is found in almost all the Eurozone 
countries, where the J6K6 strategy earns about 1% per month. There are not very big differences 
among the profits observed in each country; all the significant returns are revolving closely 
around 1%. We can therefore conclude that the country factor has a negligible importance in 
explaining the profitability of the momentum strategies for the Eurozone market. Our finding is 
in line with the results of some other previous research. Rouwenhorst (1999) analyzed 12 
European local markets came to the same conclusion; Nijman et al (2002) investigated the same 
number of European countries as we did (15) and could not find evidence of country factor 
driving the momentum profits. On the other hand, our results come in contradiction with Chan et 
al (2000) who state that winner portfolios consist mainly of stocks from the smaller countries. 
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4.2.2 Relative strength portfolios by industry 
 
The companies in the sample are not equally distributed among the industries. As it was 
mentioned earlier more than one third of the 5391 companies operate in General Industrials 
(640), Software (562) and Financial Services (546) industries. Therefore, it is important to 
determine whether the continuation effect is driven by industry momentum effects. 
 
In this section we focus on the relative strength portfolios formed on an industry basis. For each 
of the 25 industries we form relative strength portfolios with evaluation and holding periods 
equal to six months. At the end of each month stocks from each industry are ranked based on the 
previous six months performance and divided into deciles. The companies of the top decile are 
considered to be a part of Winner portfolio while those of the bottom decile are grouped in Loser 
portfolio. This zero-investment strategy of buying the Winner and selling the Loser holds these 
portfolios for six months. The return of the industry-neutral portfolio is calculated as the average 
of momentum returns in each country. Table 4.4 presents the average monthly returns of zero-
investment portfolios, standard deviation and t-statistic for the J6K6 strategy in different 
industries of Eurozone for the period 1999-2009. 
 
Out of the 25 industries analyzed, 21 exhibit positive excess returns of Winners over Losers; 17 
of them yield significant profits at 5% level. Positive, but insignificant returns produced the 
Electronic&Electrical Equipment, Food Producers, Personal Goods, and Telecommunications 
industries. We have identified four industries (Chemicals, Financial Services, Media and 
Technology) where the J6K6 strategy produced negative returns, all of them, however, 
insignificant. Our momentum strategy resulted in profits in the range of 0,33% (for 
Telecommunications) to 2,84% (for Energy). The strongest continuation effect is observed in the 
Energy industry (2,84%), followed by Oil&Gas (1,97%), Leisure Goods (1,60%), and Banks 
(1,58%). 
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Portfolio Mean St. Dev. t (mean)
1 Automobiles 1,35% 4,87% 2,93
2 Banks 1,58% 2,56% 6,54
3 Beverages 1,11% 2,09% 5,63
4 Chemicals -1,41% 14,00% -1,07
5 Construction and materials 0,89% 4,81% 1,96
6 Electronics&el.equipment 0,73% 4,37% 1,77
7 Energy 2,84% 8,52% 3,52
8 Financial Services -0,75% 8,41% -0,95
9 Food Producers 0,42% 3,89% 1,14
10 Food Retailers 1,06% 3,92% 2,86
11 Forestry 1,26% 4,74% 2,82
12 General Industries 1,03% 2,27% 4,81
13 Household 1,25% 4,66% 2,84
14 Insurance 0,69% 2,66% 2,74
15 Leisure goods 1,60% 4,79% 3,53
16 Media -0,14% 4,53% -0,34
17 Oil&Gas 1,97% 5,65% 3,69
18 Personal goods 0,01% 5,23% 0,02
19 Pharmaceuticals 1,14% 4,23% 2,86
20 Real estate 0,71% 3,28% 2,29
21 Software 0,99% 3,23% 3,25
22 Technogoly -0,11% 5,76% -0,20
23 Telecommunications 0,33% 10,56% 0,33
24 Travel&Leisure 1,07% 5,15% 2,21
25 Utilities 0,79% 2,99% 2,79
All stocks (Industry-neutral) 0,82% 1,92% 4,50
Table 4.4 Returns of Relative Strength Portfolios by Industry
Insignificant at 5% level  
 
 
The resulting industry neutral portfolio has an average monthly return of 0,82% which is 
significant at 5% level. Controlling for industry composition lowered the returns of our strategy 
by 39%, i.e. from 1,14% to 0,82%. The average individual industry standard deviation (5,09%) is 
almost three times higher than that of the resulting internationally diversified portfolio (1,92%). 
This fact indicates that a great amount of momentum profits volatility is specific to a particular 
industry and thus can be diversified.  
 
The momentum effect within the industries is not as uniform as it was the case with the countries. 
The individual industry excess returns vary to a greater extent from the average, for some 
industries exceeding the average monthly return by 2-3 times. The standard deviation of the 
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industry-neutral portfolio is 20% higher than that of the country-neutral portfolio (1,92% 
compared to 1,61%). Although the momentum profits are present in the majority of industries, 
the results are not that straightforward as in the previous situation. We conclude that the industry 
factor can not be considered as the main force that drives the excess returns. However, it is of 
some importance, since controlling for it leads to an average return decrease from 1,14% to 
0,82%. 
 
Our findings do not indicate towards the industry factor as being the main determinant of the 
momentum effect, being rather similar to the results that Nijman, Swinkels, and Verbeek (2002) 
reached. They analyzed 23 European industries using a portfolio-based regression approach and 
found that industries had a rather weak influence on the overall momentum effect, at the same 
time being stronger than the country influence, but much weaker than the individual stock factor. 
Moskowitz and Grinblatt (1999), on the other hand, state that, for the US market, industries are 
the ones responsible for the momentum effect. 
 
4.2.3 Adjustment for Market Factor 
 
Thus far we could not find a sound explanation for the existence of the continuation effect. In this 
subsection we regress the monthly excess returns of our portfolios on the market risk premium in 
order to identify a potential relation between the market risk and the momentum profits. We 
perform this regression for each of the unrestricted, country-neutral and industry-neutral Winner 
and Loser portfolios. 
 
Before estimating the regressions all data has to be tested for stationarity. One commonly used 
method for checking the existence of a unit root in the data is the Dickey-Fuller test. The results 
of this test are presented in Appendix B. The regression parameters are estimated using the OLS 
method. However, in order to use the OLS estimation technique, five fundamental assumptions 
have to be fulfilled. The results of checking the underlying OLS assumptions are presented in 
Appendix C. Conducting unit root, heteroscedasticity, serial correlation, and normality tests, we 
find the data being stationary and homoskedastic. The errors are autocorrelated therefore some 
necessary adjustments were made (See Appendix C3). The normality assumption is violated for 
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several regressions; however, we decide to use this data based on the fact that the regression 
estimators are still unbiased and have the smallest variance. 
 
The regression results obtained for the unrestricted portfolios are shown in the Table 4.5.  The 
alpha coefficient of the Winner (0,0140) is highly significant, whereas the Loser portfolio alpha 
(-0,0031) is insignificant. The alpha of the resulting Winner-Loser portfolio is 0,0171 and it is 
significant. We see that in fact adjusting for the market risk leads to the growth of the excess 
returns from 0,0114 to 0,0171 per month.  
 
t(   ) t(    )
Winner 0,0140 6,18 -0,06 -1,55
Loser -0,0031 -0,83 0,24 4,04
Winner-Loser 0,0171 6,04 -0,31 -2,16
Table 4.5. Unrestricted relative strength portfolio
α βα β
 
 
Both the Winner and the Loser have significant betas. The Loser’s higher beta (0,24) compared to 
the Winner’s (-0,06) indicates towards its greater riskiness. These rather low betas we believe to 
be the caused by the market index that we have used, which, although does include the same 
countries and industries as we do, is still consisting of a much lower number of stocks than our 
sample. The beta coefficient of the resulting Winner-Loser portfolio is negative and significant, 
meaning that the momentum abnormal profits are not a compensation for bearing an extra-risk. 
 
The results of regressing the country-neutral excess returns are presented in Table 4.6. The alpha 
of the Winner portfolio is significant and equal to 0,0071, while the alpha of the Loser is negative 
(-0,0024) and insignificant. The zero-investment portfolio earns an excess return of 0,96% which 
is highly significant and at the same time slightly smaller than if no adjustment for market risk is 
made. The beta coefficient of the resulting Winner - Loser country-neutral portfolio is negative, 
that shows, as it was mentioned above, that the momentum profits are not driven by the extra-
risk. 
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t(   ) t(    )
Winner 0,0071 3,11 0,15 3,33
Loser -0,0025 -0,97 0,19 3,32
Winner-Loser 0,0096 3,62 -0,03 -0,21
Table 4.6. Country-neutral relative strength portfolio
α βα β
 
 
For industry-neutral portfolios we obtain similar results (see Table 4.7). The Winner-Loser 
portfolio earns an excess return of 1,02%, which is indicated by a significant alpha. Thus, the 
market risk adjustment increases the excess returns from 0,82%, to 1,02%. The Loser beta is 
slightly higher than the Winner beta coefficient (0,1815 and 0,1800 respectively), showing that 
the Loser portfolio is slightly riskier than the Winner. The Winner-Loser has a negative 
insignificant beta (-0,015). 
 
t(   ) t(    )
Winner 0,0105 4,01 0,18 3,55
Loser 0,0004 0,12 0,18 4,21
Winner-Loser 0,0102 3,85 0,00 -0,03
Table 4.7. Industry-neutral relative strength portfolio
α βα β
 
 
Controlling for the market risk factor does not lead to an explanation of the return continuation 
phenomenon. The Loser portfolio stocks are slightly riskier than the Winner’s, which could 
suggest that it contains smaller companies with a higher volatility. The negative betas we have 
obtained in all of the three cases lead to the rejection of the hypothesis that the excess returns 
could be a risk compensation. 
 
4.2.4 Adjustment for Market, Size and Value Factors 
 
We add two factors to the previous regression, namely the size and value and we run it for the 
unrestricted relative strength portfolios, as well as for country-neutral and industry-neutral 
relative strength portfolios. The results obtained for the unrestricted portfolios are presented in 
the table 4.8. We obtain a significant alpha for the Winner (0,0148) and an insignificant alpha for 
the Loser (-0,0033). The alpha of the resulting Winner-Loser portfolio is 0,0180 and it is highly 
significant. Thus, adjusting for market, size and value factors increases the momentum return 
from 0,0114 to 0,0180. 
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α t(α) β t(β) γ t(γ) δ t(δ)
Winner 0,0148 6,33 -0,08 -2,36 -0,13 -1,17 -0,13 -1,10
Loser -0,0033 -0,89 0,26 4,43 0,27 1,95 -0,12 -0,61
Winner - Loser 0,0180 6,35 -0,34 -7,78 -0,40 -3,40 -0,02 -0,13
Table 4.8 Unrestricted relative strength portfolios
 
 
Both the Loser and the Winner have significant betas, the Loser being however riskier than the 
Winner (0,26 compared to -0,08). The resulting negative beta of the Winner-Loser shows that the 
excess returns are not a compensation for bearing an extra-risk. The insignificant size coefficient 
of the Winner does not provide any information related to its size factor loading. The Loser size 
coefficient is at the edge of significance at 5% level and it is significant at 10% level. This is 
likely to indicate that Loser stocks are slightly tilted towards small firms. The Winner-Loser 
portfolio has a significant negative size coefficient of -0,40, thus suggesting that the Loser 
contains more small size companies than the Winner. The coefficients we obtain for the value 
factor are insignificant for all three portfolios, making us unable to draw any inferences regarding 
its influence. 
 
Like in the previous situation, regressing the country-neutral excess returns (see table 4.9) yields 
a positive and significant alpha for the Winner (0,0076, t = 3,40) and a negative and insignificant 
alpha for the Loser (-0,0028, t = -1,11). The zero-cost portfolio earns an excess return of 1,04% 
which is highly significant and at the same time slightly higher than in the case of no adjustment 
for the three factors.  
 
α t(α) β t(β) γ t(γ) δ t(δ)
Winner 0,0076 3,40 0,15 4,33 0,11 1,27 -0,21 -2,16
Loser -0,0028 -1,11 0,20 3,68 0,21 2,47 -0,03 -0,19
Winner - Loser 0,0104 4,63 -0,05 -1,17 -0,10 -1,29 -0,18 -1,70
Table 4.9 Country-neutral relative strength portfolios
 
 
Moreover, its beta is negative, strengthening our conclusion that the momentum profits are not 
driven by extra-risk. The Loser size coefficient indicates its positive loading on the small 
companies. For the zero-cost portfolio however this coefficient in insignificant. The value 
coefficient of the Winner (-0,21, t = -2,16) indicates a negative loading on this factor.  
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α t(α) β t(β) γ t(γ) δ t(δ)
Winner 0,0109 3,89 0,18 3,80 0,13 1,27 -0,19 -1,24
Loser 0,0001 0,02 0,20 4,52 0,20 1,78 -0,04 -0,25
Winner - Loser 0,0109 3,99 -0,01 -0,32 -0,07 -0,69 -0,15 -1,09
Table 4.10 Industry-neutral relative strength portfolios
 
 
In the case of industry-neutral portfolios we obtain similar results (see Table 4.10). Factor-
adjustment increases the excess returns to 0,0109, t = 3,99. The Loser portfolio is slightly riskier 
than the Winner, while the Winner-Loser has a negative insignificant beta. The rest of the 
coefficients are insignificant, thus showing no relation between the excess returns on one hand 
and size and value on the other hand. 
 
Adding the size and value factors to our regressions did not add some further clarity, 
unfortunately. We still obtained negative betas for the zero-cost portfolio. Furthermore, as we 
supposed, the Loser portfolio is somewhat orientated towards smaller stocks, these not being the 
case for the Winner or the Winner-Loser portfolios. Therefore, a higher risk associated with 
smaller firms cannot explain the excess returns. Even less edifying are the coefficients of the 
value factor, which, with one exception, are never significant, thus having no explanatory power 
for the momentum profitability. 
 
4.2.5 Behavioural finance interpretation 
 
As none of the factors analyzed proved to be of a major importance in the return continuation 
phenomenon, we turn to the explanations proposed by the behavioural finance literature. 
Investors tend to behave rather irrationally, under-reacting and over-reacting to the new 
information released. They underreact to the public information, as they are less involved with it. 
On the other hand, they overreact to the private information they obtain, having excessive 
confidence in its reliability. This type of behaviour leads to a slow incorporation of the public 
information into the price which in consequence causes the performance of the stocks to persist 
on a medium term. However, on longer terms, more and more information becomes available and 
as the overreaction effect disappears, the returns tend to revert to their intrinsic value, causing the 
momentum profits to vanish. Here, another aspect of investor irrationality comes into play. When 
the investors’ predictions and expectances are fulfilled, their self-confidence is rocketed up, but, 
 40 
when they fail to materialize, it is not shaken to the same level. This peculiarity causes the 
momentum effect to be persistent in time, being documented by all the research done in this area 
starting with the early ‘90s and continuing to the present days. 
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5. Conclusion 
In this chapter we summarize our findings, specifying which of them are in line with the previous 
studies and which of them bring something new. We also make some further research 
suggestions.  
 
5.1 Concluding remarks 
 
Our study investigates the profitability of the momentum strategies on a market formed of the 15 
countries members of the Eurozone as of December 2008. These strategies are also analyzed at 
the country and industry level in order to i) determine their profitability at a more disaggregated 
level and ii) construct country- and industry-neutral portfolios, thus controlling for these two 
factors. We analyze 16 different strategies which combine formation (J) and holding (K) periods 
of 3, 6, 9 and 12 months. We rank the stocks according to their performance in the previous J 
months and hold them subsequently for K months. The top 10% stocks form the Winner portfolio 
and the bottom 10% stocks form the Loser portfolio. In each month we buy the Winner and sell 
short the Loser, thus the momentum profit is represented by the excess return of the Winner over 
the Loser. 
 
All the strategies earn positive momentum profits, with 13 of them being significant. We find a 
significant average excess return of the Winners over the Losers of 0,8% per month, which is 
close to the 1% return documented by the previous studies (e.g. Jegadeesh and Titman 1993, 
Rouwenhorst 1998, Nijman et al 2002). The most profitable strategy for the Eurozone market is 
the one that ranks the stocks according to their past six month performance and holds them for 
three months. We find a slightly shorter horizon of momentum profitability compared to the 
previous studies, which document the J12K3 strategy as being the most profitable.  
 
For further tests and identification of the momentum profits sources we analyze in detail the 
strategy that constructs Winners and Losers on the basis of their past six month performance and 
holds them for other six months. Performing a robustness test indicates towards the consistency 
and the similarity of the momentum profits throughout different time sub-periods. The current 
financial crisis does not reduce these profits, due to the fact that it affects the Losers more 
negatively than the Winners, causing the excess returns to actually increase. 
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Analyzing the momentum profits at the country and industry level shows similar results. 
Significant and positive excess returns are present in 12 of the 15 countries and in 17 of the 25 
industries included in our sample. However, on the country level these profits are more uniform 
and have a lower standard deviation than on the industry level. Moreover, controlling for the 
country composition reduces the excess returns by only 13%, whereas controlling for the industry 
composition causes a decrease of 39%. This suggests that the country factor is irrelevant in 
explaining the continuation effect, whilst the industry factor could be thought as being partly 
responsible for the excess returns. 
 
As other potential sources of the momentum profits we analyze the CAPM beta and the Fama-
French size and value factors, performing regressions for the unrestricted, country-neutral and 
industry-neutral portfolios. Both models show similar results for the three portfolios. We obtain a 
negative beta for the Winner-Loser portfolio which leads to the rejection of the hypothesis that 
the excess returns could be a compensation for bearing an extra-risk associated with this 
portfolio. Including the size and value factors does not provide much of additional insights. We 
obtain a similar negative beta for the Winner-Loser portfolio. The Loser portfolio seems to load 
heavier on the small size companies; however, the Winner-Loser portfolio has insignificant 
coefficients for both the size and value factors. 
 
None of the country, industry, risk, size or value factors seems to be the main force driving the 
momentum profits. In such conditions, we believe that only relevant explanations could be those 
offered by the behavioural finance research. According to them, the momentum effect is caused 
by a slow incorporation of the public information into the prices due to investors’ higher 
confidence in their private information (to which they overreact) than in the public information 
(to which they underreact). As the publicly available information is finally incorporated into the 
price, the overreaction is mitigated away and the momentum profits tend to vanish. 
 
Our findings indicate towards the rejection of both the efficient market hypothesis and the 
investor behaviour as being rational. 
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In general, the results we have reached are in line with the main studies investigating momentum. 
However, we have identified a series of particular aspects that characterize our time period and 
data sample. Firstly, the time horizon over which momentum strategies are profitable seems to be 
shorter than previously documented, strategies with higher J’s and K’s yielding the lowest excess 
returns. This might be an indication that, due to the improved information technology and the 
speed the information circulates, the markets are becoming more efficient. Secondly, although the 
current financial crisis decreases the returns of the Winner and Loser portfolios, the latter is more 
drastically affected, which leads to the zero-cost momentum strategy being actually more 
profitable. Lastly, we find the industries as being partly responsible for the momentum effect; 
when it comes to the main momentum source, however, the only explanation that stands seems to 
be investor irrationality. 
 
5.3 Suggestions for further research 
 
As our study, in line with the previous ones, could not identify among the factors analyzed one 
which could be considered as the main force behind the return continuation phenomenon, we 
believe that the further research should be focused on this aspect. Thus far, the explanations 
offered by behaviourists seem to be the only ones that hold; however, they are just a supposition. 
Therefore, elaborating a model that could capture the momentum determinants represents, in our 
opinion, the main area of further research. Moreover, as there has been documented a correlation 
between European and American stock markets (Rouwenhorst 1998), it seems that there is a 
unique factor that drives their behaviour. In this sense, further studies could incorporate stocks 
from all the major global markets, in order to obtain a panoramic view on the return continuation. 
 
On a smaller scale, other areas of interest are represented by three increasingly important markets 
– Eastern Europe, Russia and China, for which we could not find any momentum dedicated 
research. For the time being, it might be rather complicated to gain the necessary information for 
these markets, due to a lack of transparence; however, in the near future this should be possible. 
On the other hand, the development of these markets will probably cause them to behave like the 
already developed ones, in consequence exhibiting the same characteristics, while an 
investigation of the current situation might lead to extremely interesting findings. 
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Appendix A. Country and Industry Statistics 
Table A.1 shows the distribution of companies among different countries in the data sample 
Country Number % of total
Austria 181 3,36%
Belgium 278 5,16%
Cyprus 117 2,17%
Finland 183 3,39%
France 1400 25,97%
Germany 1601 29,70%
Greece 374 6,94%
Ireland 72 1,34%
Italy 414 7,68%
Luxembourg 51 0,95%
Malta 15 0,28%
Netherlands 249 4,62%
Portugal 139 2,58%
Slovenia 75 1,39%
Spain 242 4,49%
Total 5391 100,00%
Table A.1. Country Statistic
 
The distribution of firms among various industries is presented in Table A.2 
Industry Number % of total
Automobiles 98 1,83%
Banks 240 4,46%
Beverages 105 1,94%
Chemicals 135 2,50%
Construction and materials 287 5,32%
Electronics&electrical equipment 178 3,31%
Energy 50 0,92%
Financial Services 546 10,13%
Food Producers 252 4,67%
Food Retailers 48 0,88%
Forestry 53 0,98%
General Industrials 640 11,88%
Household 142 2,63%
Insurance 122 2,27%
Leisure goods 78 1,44%
Media 295 5,48%
Oil&Gas 62 1,15%
Personal goods 209 3,88%
Pharmaceuticals 234 4,34%
Real estate 444 8,23%
Software 562 10,42%
Technogoly 154 2,86%
Telecommunications 85 1,58%
Travel&Leisure 226 4,19%
Utilities 145 2,69%
Total 5391 100,00%
Table A.2. Industry Statistic
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Appendix B. Stationarity 
 
In case with 12 regressions the augmented Dickey-Fuller test will be performed. The outcomes of 
White’s test are presented in table A.1. For all regressions the value of t-statistic is higher than 
the critical value for 5% level. It means that the null hypothesis stating that there is a unit root in 
the data is rejected, and the data is stationary. 
 
t-statistic Critical Value
Buy -5,06 -2,89
Sell -2,97 -2,89
Buy -2,95 -2,89
Sell -2,91 -2,89
Buy -3,22 -2,89
Sell -3,08 -2,89
Market risk premium -9,37 -2,89
SMB -10,92 -2,89
HML -5,67 -2,89
Table B.1. Outcomes from Dickey-Fuller test
Momentum strategy
Country neutral
Industry neutral
 
Appendix C. Testing OLS assumptions (Brooks 2007) 
 
There are five underlying assumptions that should be tested. 
 
1. ( ) 0=tuE  
This assumption requires the average value of the errors to be equal to zero. It is obviously 
fulfilled as far as constant term tα  is included in the regression equation. 
 
2. ( ) ∞<= 2var σtu  
The assumption of homoscedasticity requires the variance of the errors to be constant. To avoid 
heteroscedasticity in the regression models we use heteroscedasticity-consistent standard error 
estimates. This option is available in econometrics software package EViews 6.0. 
 
One of the popular statistical tests for heteroscedasticity is White’s test. One of its advantages is 
that it does not require normal distribution of errors. To conduct White’s test the auxiliary 
regression should be built. For CAPM it will look as following: 
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( ) ( )
ttftmtftmt vrrrru +−+−+=
2
,,3,,21
2ˆ ααα  
where tv  is a normally distributed disturbance term independent of tu . 
 
For Fama-French model the auxiliary regression will look as following: 
( ) ( )
ttftmtftmt vHMLSMBrrHMLSMBrru +++−+++−+=
2
7
2
6
2
,,543,,21
2ˆ ααααααα . 
 
Given that the auxiliary regressions should be estimated, R
2
 obtained from the regression should 
be multiplied by the number of observations, T, such as: 
( )mTR 22 ~ χ , 
where m is the number of regressors in the auxiliary regression. For CAPM m is equal to 2, for 
Fama-French m is equal to 6. 
 
The outcomes of White’s test are presented in table B.1. For all regressions the value of 2TR  is 
less than the critical value of 2χ -test statistic for 5% level. It means that the joint null hypothesis 
that errors are homoscedastic can not be rejected. 
 
TR
2
Critical value TR
2
Critical value
Buy 0,81 10,60 14,22 18,55
Sell 0,16 10,60 2,76 18,55
Buy 7,56 10,60 17,58 18,55
Sell 8,32 10,60 15,02 18,55
Buy 5,14 10,60 12,92 18,55
Sell 0,20 10,60 1,39 18,55
CAPM Fama-French
Table C.1. Outcomes from White's test
Momentum 
strategy
Country 
neutral
Industry 
neutral  
 
3. ( ) 0,cov =ti uu  
This assumption requires that errors are uncorrelated over time, or that there is no autocorrelation 
in error term. To test if the errors are autocorrelated, the Durbin-Watson (DW) test can be used. 
DW is a test for first order autocorrelation. To apply DW test several conditions should be 
fulfilled, among them are presence of constant term in the regression, non-stochastic regressors, 
and absence of lags of dependent variable. All these conditions are fulfilled in all the regressions. 
 49 
The null hypothesis of DW test is that errors at time t-1 and t are independent. DW test statistic 
can be calculated as follows (approximate value): 
( )ρ−= 12DW , 
where ρ  is a estimated correlation coefficient. DW test has two critical values: upper and lower. 
 
The outcomes of Durbin-Watson test are presented in table B.2. For all regressions the value of t 
statictic is less than the critical value of Ld . It means that the null hypothesis that errors are 
uncorrelated over time is rejected, and there is autocorrelation between errors. 
According to Durbin-Watson test we obtained positive autocorrelation in the residuals. This 
result is logical because momentum strategy implies positive autocorrelation on a medium-term 
horizon. However positive autocorrelation leads to inefficient regression coefficients, which 
means that they are not BLUE for this regression. To avoid these consequences of autocorrelation 
some measures should be taken to deal with it. 
 
t-statistic dL dU t-statistic dL dU
Buy 0,47 1,52 1,56 0,52 1,48 1,60
Sell 0,38 1,52 1,56 0,38 1,48 1,60
Buy 0,37 1,52 1,56 0,42 1,48 1,60
Sell 0,42 1,52 1,56 0,40 1,48 1,60
Buy 0,34 1,52 1,56 0,36 1,48 1,60
Sell 0,40 1,52 1,56 0,39 1,48 1,60
Fama-French
Momentum 
strategy
Country 
neutral
Industry 
neutral
Table C.2. Outcomes from Durbin-Watson test
CAPM
 
 
One of the popular approaches to deal with autocorrelation is Cochrane-Orcutt procedure. To 
apply this approach the model for CAPM case should be specified as follows: 
Ri,t – rf,t = α + β [Rm,t – rf,t] + εi,t 
ttiti u+= −1,, ρεε . 
For Fama-French model the regression should be specified as follows: 
Ri,t – rf,t = α + β [Rm,t – rf,t] + γSMB + δHML +  εi,t  
ttiti u+= −1,, ρεε , 
where ρ  represents correlation coefficient for both models. 
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According to Cochrane-Orcutt procedure both equations were estimated using OLS method for 
unrestricted, country-neutral, and industry-neutral portfolios. As a result of these regressions the 
residuals were obtained and were used to run the additional regression: 
ttiti u+= −1,, ˆˆ ερε . 
From the regression above we get estimations of correlation coefficients ρˆ  for all the models. 
Using obtained ρˆ  new regressions can be run: 
(Ri,t – rf,t )*= α* + β [Rm,t – rf,t]* + ui,t 
(Ri,t – rf,t )*= α* + β[Rm,t – rf,t]* + γSMB*+ δHML* +  ui,t , 
where:  
(Ri,t – rf,t )*= (Ri,t – rf,t )- ρ (Ri,t-1 – rf,t-1 ) 
α*=(1- ρ ) α 
[Rm,t – rf,t]*= [Rm,t – rf,t] -  ρ  [Rm,t-1 – rf,t-1] 
SMB t *= SMB t - ρ  SMB t-1 
HML t *= HML t - ρ HML t-1 
1,, −−= tititu ρεε  
These models contain error terms that are free from autocorrelation; therefore we can run the 
regression and get unbiased and efficient coefficients. 
 
4. ( ) 0,cov =tt xu  
This assumption requires the data to be non-stochastic. However, the regression estimators are 
consistent and unbiased even if the stochastic regressors are present. 
 
5. ( )2.0~ σNut  
This assumption requires the disturbances to be normally distributed. To test for normality Bera-
Jarque (BJ) test is applied. Test statistic for BJ test looks as following: 
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were T is the sample size, 1b  and 2b  are coefficients of skewness and kurtosis respectively. The 
test statistic follows ( )22χ  distribution. 
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The p-values of Bera-Jarque test are presented in Table B.3. For six of 12 regressions p-value 
from Bera-Jarque test is smaller than 0,05 (or 5%), it means that for these regressions the null 
hypothesis of normality at 5% level is rejected. 
 
CAPM Fama-French
Buy 0,00 0,00
Sell 0,62 0,58
Buy 0,84 0,84
Sell 0,00 0,01
Buy 0,73 0,00
Sell 0,05 0,00
Momentum 
strategy
Table C.3. Outcomes from Bera-Jarque test
Country 
neutral
Industry 
neutral  
 
However it is possible to use this data for the purposes of the analysis. Estimators of the 
regressions still will be unbiased and will have smaller variance. 
